15. The Rationale of Believing in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ from the Dead

                                                                         We shall end this Study with a reminder that to appreciate this conclusion, we have to keep in mind the points we have already discussed in the previous Posts. However, the crucial point that influences to a large extent our understanding of the resurrection of Jesus is the depth of consciousness we have developed through our life. Have we a normally grown consciousness as we age through the years, or is it blocked and maimed by our one-sided involvements in the world? If a person considers himself or herself as part of this world to such a degree that there is no essential difference between animals and the humans, consciousness too will remain restricted purely to the material realm of this world. Such a person is not in a position to understand any higher truth that demands refined consciousness reaching out to the spiritual level of reality. To take in the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, one needs openness not only to the temporal, physical and material reality, but also to the eternal, non-physical and the spiritual dimension. Only such people are eligible to receive the gift of faith from God that is an essential constituent of our belief in the resurrection.
                                                                        It comes down to the question of our state of being that determines our capacity to receive anything new including the revelation from God of which the resurrection of Jesus from the dead takes pride of place. It does not mean that it depends on us whether we receive the grace of God in the form of the gift of faith, but only that we need the minimum requirement of readiness to receive it. It is like accepting the invitation to the wedding feast where everything is ready where the minimum requirement of wedding dress is taken for granted. The quality of our consciousness is the wedding dress required from our part to enter the reception chamber to enjoy the feast. Is our consciousness clouded, darkened or blocked when confronted with this grand invitation? Being immersed in this material world, if we are not attentive, it is easy to be mesmerized by the display of this world where our consciousness and conscience are forced to be submerged under vanities. The rationale of our belief is to be gathered from the particular language-game we play through the religious language we engage in as we have seen in the previous Posts.
                                                                        Here we shall inquire into the role of our consciousness in believing what we believe and its rationality. The modernist position on consciousness influenced many thinkers in dealing with the question of the resurrection of Jesus. The Catholic Church described and condemned the modernist view on the resurrection of Christ in the decree "Lamentabili" in its 36th and 37th propositions. The 36th proposition reads: "The Resurrection of our Savior is not a fact of the historical order, but a fact of the purely supernatural order neither proved nor provable, which Christian consciousness has little by little inferred from other facts". This condemnation is directly against the position of Alfred Loisy, a former catholic priest, in his books"Autour d'un Petit Livre", pp. viii, 120-121, 169 and "L'Evangile et L'Eglise", pp.74-78, 120-121, 171 constituting the modernist position. If the Resurrection were merely a historical fact pertaining only to the confines of this world, it would not be any better than the raising of Lazarus, the daughter of Jairus or the son of the widow of Nain. They were meant to die again without being absorbed by the power of the Holy Spirit as in the case of Jesus Christ who could become the living Spirit dispensing salvation to those who believe in him. The proof for the historicity of the Resurrection is provided by the empty tomb and the appearances of Jesus after the resurrection that has been amply treated by innumerable scholars, which need not be repeated here. 
                                                                      The crux of the problem with Resurrection is in the trans-historical and eternal component of the reality of Resurrection. Here the role of consciousness comes into play. The modernists insist on the gradual inference of the fact of resurrection by the  Christian consciousness  from other facts. Which are these facts?They think that the Old Testament prophecies and the expectation of their fulfillment resulted in the Christian belief in the Resurrection. The main argument against this view is that what really happened in the Resurrection was beyond all expectations that even the Apostles themselves were perplexed about and could not bring themselves to believe. This is in the context of the fact that the Apostles and the closest disciples of Jesus were specially trained to believe in him through a period of almost 3 years. So, how did the Apostles and the disciples were able to finally believe in the Resurrection?
                                                                      This was not possible without a complete revolution in their personal lives for which Jesus prepared them. The Good News proclaimed by Jesus to repent because the Kingdom of God is at hand conveyed the message of a total conversion from our old ways to new ones embodied in his person and realized in the Resurrection. Without such a total change of our inner self and consequent perspectives, nothing of eternal value could be understood by us, let alone appropriated! Such a well prepared ground is watered by God sending His Spirit into us causing faith in the Resurrection as well as all matters pertaining to the eternal.
Unscientific? Do not forget to refresh oneself with our previous Posts treating about language-games and the role of Metaphysics as the tacit foundation of Physics. When speaking of Metaphysics, one has to be cautious, especially because Wittgenstein himself whose philosophical method we uphold, was himself skeptical about it. Of course, Wittgenstein had in mind the empiricism of David Hume and John Locke as well as the rationalism of Rene Descartes and Immanuel Kant. When he spoke of the aim of Philosophy as bringing back the metaphysical use of language to our ordinary use, he had them in mind besides others with similar tendencies. However, Wittgenstein paved the way for the legitimate use of religious language through the notion of "language-games" whereby grammar tells us what anything is with a reference to theology as grammar. Besides, in the strictly logical treatment of language in his "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", Wittgenstein left open the possibility of the "mystical" that was succinctly expressed in the last proposition of the book:"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one should be silent". Each science and branch of knowledge has meaning only within its own language-game and this applies to empirical sciences as well as Philosophy and Theology.
Therefore, no science can sit in judgment on religious language and vice-versa, if one wants to avoid the pathetic situation of a sitting duck before the hunter in the form of Logic that governs all branches of knowledge. Or shall we say that the rigid materialist inevitably saws off the branch on which he is seated? He thinks that he is defending reason, science and truth and yet ends up with destroying them without a trace of remorse, may be because he does it in good faith! 

14. Meanings of Words as their Use in language (Contd)

                                                                                   The task of Philosophy is not to advance any complex or hidden theories, as sometimes is done in metaphysics, that underlie the surface features of language. The correct method would be to assemble reminders of how we actually use language in our everyday life  that does not look for anything beneath the surface of language. However," 'Essence' is expressed by grammar" (P.I., para.371) and "Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar)". (P.I., Para. 373).
                                                  What Wittgenstein means by grammar is the "depth grammar" of language and not the "surface grammar" we learn in school grammar classes. "Depth grammar is employed in language-games and like any game we play, language-games too have rules. These rules are not strict boundaries, but overlapping and fluid ones. "Rule" and "agreement" are related to one another like cousins. Similarly, the uses of "rule" and that of "same" are interwoven as in the use of "proposition" and the use of "true". The tendency to create an ideal language is fraught with danger as our ordinary language is perfectly in order as it is. The consequence of this insight was that his own "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" and the "Principia Mathematica" of Bertrand Russell fell by the wayside. G. E. Moore's "Philosophy of Common Sense" had to beat a fast retreat on epistemological grounds. The "depth grammar' of our language governs our use of words and to look for a "perfect' and "idealistic" use of words is nothing but a mirage.
                                                  " 'But the words, significantly uttered,have after all not only a surface, but also the dimension of depth' ". (P.I., para. 594). This depth in the form of a deeper meaning one may have in one's mind is not what is meant by depth grammar. In search of meaning of words, the context of each speaker's description of his or her 'meaning' of some expression reveals 'depth grammar'. Wittgenstein investigates 'meaning' from different directions through concepts of 'family resemblances' of 'meaning', 'understanding', 'thinking', 'intending' and similar concepts. "...When we mean something, it is like going up to someone"..." we go up to the thing we mean" (P.I., para. 455). Here we have a reference to 'intentionality' treated in P.I. from para. 428 to para. 465. 'Intentionality' is crucial in understanding how language is connected to reality. When a person actually uses words, depth grammar reveals whatever it is that accompanies those words. 'Meaning' encompasses the subjective-human aspects and pin-pointing meaning at the same time brings out the 'deep meaning' enmeshed in the 'depth grammar'. We refer to the surrounding circumstances and relationships that accompany our language use through depth grammar.It is rooted in a whole set of activities into which language is woven,derived from 'forms of life' of the subject or the subjects involved. 
                                                         'Surface grammar' is about words and their syntactic features, whereas 'depth grammar' is about the way an expression is used and refers to its semantic character. While the 'surface grammar' remains the same in various uses, 'depth grammar' is context-sensitive and varies due to change of contexts and is constituted by rules of language-games. The connection between 'doing' and 'meaning' constitutes language-games. Depth grammar only describes and in no way explains the use of signs (See P.I., para. 496). The wrong notions of 'understanding', 'thinking', 'meaning', 'intending' etc. as mental processes are demolished by a grammatical investigation of the words 'reading' and 'understanding'. We do not base our criteria for determining if someone has understood something or is reading something on inner states or processes, but on their external actions. There are no absolute rules or fundamental justification for following rules the way we do as our shared participation in certain forms of life is enough justification.
                                                          With these glimpses of "Meanings of Words as their Use in Language" as practiced in Linguistic Analysis by the Philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, we shall proceed to the last Post of this Study connecting them to the meaningfulness of the expression "Resurrection of Jesus Christ from the Dead".     

13. Meanings of Words as their Use in Language (Contd)

                                                       How does a word signify something? The most natural and easiest way would be to affix a sign on to the object signified by the word. If the sign for slab is affixed on the slab, on being shown the sign 'slab', the assistant can bring it to the mason. The function of a name is similar to this and the name is used to mean the object designated, without the object itself being its meaning. If the object designated were its meaning, the word 'Paul' would have no meaning when the person represented by the word dies. Moreover one and the same word 'Bank', for example, could not be used to mean more than one object, which is not the case.  
                                                     From Augustine's description of teaching language by pointing to objects and uttering names, it would appear that we teach meanings of words by pointing to the objects that they name. We go wrong if we take such connection between word and thing is the fundamental relationship fixing language to the world. The reason is that this relationship can be seen only after a great deal of language use is in place, which Wittgenstein calls its depth grammar, about which we shall see in the next Post. When we discuss the meaning of a word as its use in language, the definitions and fixed boundaries of rules that govern its use may be thought of as binding on our mind. But, this is not the case as we can see how, for example, we use a word like 'game' without strictly bound rules and fixed boundaries. Various uses of the word 'game' are based on similarities akin to those among various members of a family called family resemblances without strict definitions and setting up of boundaries. Words are not bounded by any rigidity, but are flexible enough to be used in various contexts with different meanings as there are no sharp boundaries that determine their uses and consequently their meanings. Wittgenstein terms this kind of use of language as "language-games".
                                                    Language-games are understood in comparison with the games we usually play. Is there any one thing that is common in the games we play the absence of which will edge anyone of the games out? It would seem that there must be something common  in all of them in order to merit the name of 'game'. This is the consequence of our thinking without looking. The importance of observation and "seeing" should not be diminished by our "thinking". Instead of any one thing common to all games and language-games, similarities and family relationships should serve as reasons for bringing them under the tag of games and language-games. This is what we do in everyday use of language and no one has any complaint about 'inexactness' in our use of words. If anyone has a complaint, he or she owes us a definition of 'exactness'!  "What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand" (Philosophical Investigations, paragraph no. 118. Hereafter, P.I., para. no.).
                                                 If our ordinary language is too coarse and material for what we want to say,
'how is another one to be constructed' with what we have? (See P.I., para.no. 120). Meaning is not something other than the word. "Here the word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow that you can buy with it. (But contrast: money, and its use)". (P.I., para. no. 120)."Every sign 'by itself' seems dead. 'What' gives it life? In use it is 'alive'. Is life breathed into it there? Or is the 'use' its life?" (P,I,, para.no. 432). A sign is alive in its use. A language-game is understood when we understand the rules that constitute it. Rules are conventions or customs in contexts and their observance consists in ways of doing things or living. That is why we cannot understand a language-game without understanding a form of life. And words in language are signs to be used by us. How? We shall see it in the next Post. (To be Contd).

12. Meanings of Words as their Use in Language

                                                            Ludwig Wittgenstein starts his book "Philosophical Investigations" with a quotation from St. Augustine's Confessions, I, 8 that is a description of how children learn language. It is, however, the description of a primitive form of language mainly concerned with naming things around us. Children learn language by naming things by pointing to them and saying their names. It is to be noted here that children learn language not by explanations, but by training in use of language,which has far-reaching consequences in understanding the use of language for conveying meanings. This way language and its use and meaning are being ingrained in children that stand as the foundation for their life-long employment of words meaningfully. One has to keep in mind, however, that meanings are not attached to words like labels nor are the things themselves referred to by the words their meanings. If it were so, we would not have been able to use the same word for many things and many words for the same thing.
                                                           Augustine used single words and mostly nouns to explain how the children learn language. However, single words can be used to convey meanings which are complex, if one is trained for it. Examples are how construction workers act correctly on hearing the words like "slab", "pillar". "concrete" etc. by bringing them to the masons and other builders. They know the meanings of those words by correctly reacting to them by carrying those objects to the persons concerned and that means that they know how to use those words under the circumstances. This presupposes a particular kind of training and with a different type of training, results could have been different even if in both cases the method of ostensive teaching was followed. Ostensive teaching is the method used for teaching children the names of things as we have seen above. The reason for this anomaly is that pointing to a thing can mean different things in different situations and circumstances of persons and therefore previous training is a necessity for capturing the right meanings of words. It is immaterial what kind of an image is evoked in one's mind in hearing a word as it does not influence its meaning since meaning is determined by its correct use seen in appropriate actions. Words and their meanings are not isolated parts, but are connected to the whole web of language just as a brake is set up by connecting up rod and lever within a mechanism. In isolation from the mechanism, it is not even a lever, let alone a brake-lever.
                                                         As the child's language is expanded to include not only simple nouns, but also words like "there", "this" and numerals etc., the training methods also are expanded. One may think of words like tools in a tool box: hammer. pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a ruler, a glue-pot, glue, nails, screws etc. Although all of them are called tools, their functions differ and just so the functions of words are diverse. However, in the case of words, their uniform appearance confuses us as their application is not presented to us clearly, especially in Philosophy! Compare words to the handles looking more or less alike in the cabin of a locomotive. The handle of a crank can be moved continuously (regulating the opening of a valve); the handle of a switch has only two effective positions, either on or off; if the handle of a brake-lever is pulled harder, the harder it brakes and the handle of a pump that has an effect only when it is moved to and fro. The words in language too have diverse uses though they look alike or even the same words may be used differently for different purposes. There is no one element in common in the use of  those tools and this is true of the words we use in language too. Therefore, it is essential for our understanding to know how words signify something in our language before declaring the meaninglessness of any expression in language.
                                                        Some might wonder what is the connection between this kind of analysis of language and the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, our original theme. The connection has to be seen in the contexts of claims by anyone extolling the merits of scientific language as against that of religious language. Our endeavor is to show that scientific language cannot be sealed up in an ivory tower in the face of acute logical observations about the way our language functions that is applicable to scientific language as well as religious language and any employment of words with meaning anywhere. (To be Contd).