How does a word signify something? The most natural and easiest way would be to affix a sign on to the object signified by the word. If the sign for slab is affixed on the slab, on being shown the sign 'slab', the assistant can bring it to the mason. The function of a name is similar to this and the name is used to mean the object designated, without the object itself being its meaning. If the object designated were its meaning, the word 'Paul' would have no meaning when the person represented by the word dies. Moreover one and the same word 'Bank', for example, could not be used to mean more than one object, which is not the case.
From Augustine's description of teaching language by pointing to objects and uttering names, it would appear that we teach meanings of words by pointing to the objects that they name. We go wrong if we take such connection between word and thing is the fundamental relationship fixing language to the world. The reason is that this relationship can be seen only after a great deal of language use is in place, which Wittgenstein calls its depth grammar, about which we shall see in the next Post. When we discuss the meaning of a word as its use in language, the definitions and fixed boundaries of rules that govern its use may be thought of as binding on our mind. But, this is not the case as we can see how, for example, we use a word like 'game' without strictly bound rules and fixed boundaries. Various uses of the word 'game' are based on similarities akin to those among various members of a family called family resemblances without strict definitions and setting up of boundaries. Words are not bounded by any rigidity, but are flexible enough to be used in various contexts with different meanings as there are no sharp boundaries that determine their uses and consequently their meanings. Wittgenstein terms this kind of use of language as "language-games".
Language-games are understood in comparison with the games we usually play. Is there any one thing that is common in the games we play the absence of which will edge anyone of the games out? It would seem that there must be something common in all of them in order to merit the name of 'game'. This is the consequence of our thinking without looking. The importance of observation and "seeing" should not be diminished by our "thinking". Instead of any one thing common to all games and language-games, similarities and family relationships should serve as reasons for bringing them under the tag of games and language-games. This is what we do in everyday use of language and no one has any complaint about 'inexactness' in our use of words. If anyone has a complaint, he or she owes us a definition of 'exactness'! "What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand" (Philosophical Investigations, paragraph no. 118. Hereafter, P.I., para. no.).
If our ordinary language is too coarse and material for what we want to say,
'how is another one to be constructed' with what we have? (See P.I., para.no. 120). Meaning is not something other than the word. "Here the word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow that you can buy with it. (But contrast: money, and its use)". (P.I., para. no. 120)."Every sign 'by itself' seems dead. 'What' gives it life? In use it is 'alive'. Is life breathed into it there? Or is the 'use' its life?" (P,I,, para.no. 432). A sign is alive in its use. A language-game is understood when we understand the rules that constitute it. Rules are conventions or customs in contexts and their observance consists in ways of doing things or living. That is why we cannot understand a language-game without understanding a form of life. And words in language are signs to be used by us. How? We shall see it in the next Post. (To be Contd).
From Augustine's description of teaching language by pointing to objects and uttering names, it would appear that we teach meanings of words by pointing to the objects that they name. We go wrong if we take such connection between word and thing is the fundamental relationship fixing language to the world. The reason is that this relationship can be seen only after a great deal of language use is in place, which Wittgenstein calls its depth grammar, about which we shall see in the next Post. When we discuss the meaning of a word as its use in language, the definitions and fixed boundaries of rules that govern its use may be thought of as binding on our mind. But, this is not the case as we can see how, for example, we use a word like 'game' without strictly bound rules and fixed boundaries. Various uses of the word 'game' are based on similarities akin to those among various members of a family called family resemblances without strict definitions and setting up of boundaries. Words are not bounded by any rigidity, but are flexible enough to be used in various contexts with different meanings as there are no sharp boundaries that determine their uses and consequently their meanings. Wittgenstein terms this kind of use of language as "language-games".
Language-games are understood in comparison with the games we usually play. Is there any one thing that is common in the games we play the absence of which will edge anyone of the games out? It would seem that there must be something common in all of them in order to merit the name of 'game'. This is the consequence of our thinking without looking. The importance of observation and "seeing" should not be diminished by our "thinking". Instead of any one thing common to all games and language-games, similarities and family relationships should serve as reasons for bringing them under the tag of games and language-games. This is what we do in everyday use of language and no one has any complaint about 'inexactness' in our use of words. If anyone has a complaint, he or she owes us a definition of 'exactness'! "What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand" (Philosophical Investigations, paragraph no. 118. Hereafter, P.I., para. no.).
If our ordinary language is too coarse and material for what we want to say,
'how is another one to be constructed' with what we have? (See P.I., para.no. 120). Meaning is not something other than the word. "Here the word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow that you can buy with it. (But contrast: money, and its use)". (P.I., para. no. 120)."Every sign 'by itself' seems dead. 'What' gives it life? In use it is 'alive'. Is life breathed into it there? Or is the 'use' its life?" (P,I,, para.no. 432). A sign is alive in its use. A language-game is understood when we understand the rules that constitute it. Rules are conventions or customs in contexts and their observance consists in ways of doing things or living. That is why we cannot understand a language-game without understanding a form of life. And words in language are signs to be used by us. How? We shall see it in the next Post. (To be Contd).
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